The Jordanian Predicament

Shaul Arieli - 14/12/2009

At the end of the War of Independence – the outcome of the Arab rejection of the Partition Plan – 600,000 Palestinians became refugees in Arab states, especially Jordan. Until 1988, the Palestinians were not included in the global agenda and negotiations on the future of the West Bank were carried out directly between Israel and Jordan. Many Israeli political leaders at the time regarded Jordan as the Palestinian homeland, and cited the growing Palestinian population there as validation of this view.

Following the Six Day War, an additional 250,000 Palestinians from the West Bank also relocated to Jordan, and the depleted Jordan Valley, according to the “Alon Plan,” was viewed as part of the security zone against the “Eastern Front.” Jordan’s detachment in 1988 from the West Bank did not affect the “Open Bridges” policy and the gates were opened even wider with the signing of the 1994 Peace Agreement with Israel. Since then, however, the Hashemite family has avoided challenging the leading role of the PLO in negotiations with Israel on the future of the West Bank, and reiterated that it is in Jordan’s interest that an independent state be established in the territories.

Even though Israel has stopped making public statements in support of a Palestinian homeland in Jordan, the facts on the ground have not changed. Since the year 2000, 250,000 Palestinians have emigrated from the West Bank to Jordan, contrary to the trend perceived after the Oslo agreements, where tens of thousands of Palestinian visitors flowed to the West Bank from Jordan and outstayed their permits.  In response, the Jordanians have recently decided to refuse or postpone granting Jordanian citizenship to Palestinians seeking family reunification, in order to reduce the number of registered refugees in Jordan, thus hoping to encourage their return to the West Bank once a permanent settlement is reached.

Jordan fears that in addition to existing pressures resulting from tribal conflicts, there is a potential stream of refugees from Iraq when the Americans pull out, a huge foreign aid debt and the critical shortage of water.  It also might face a heavy flood of Palestinian refugees if the PA collapses or in the wake of an escalating security situation, such as another “Cast Lead” operation.  Furthermore, the Jordanians are fearful that Israel might opt to withdraw to the security fence border if it proves disadvantageous to continue to hold onto the West Bank, in which case the subsequent chaos will only increase immigration eastwards.

As a result, we are now seeing intensive activity on the part of the Jordanian kingdom to promote the establishment of a Palestinian state, such as the greetings that the king sent to the J-Street conference urging Israel to accept a peace agreement that would include no further demands, or the suggestion to transfer responsibility for the Palestinian issue to the Security Council. Jordan even voiced support for the unilateral Palestinian declaration that it would establish a state with temporary borders.

Israeli supporters of the “optimistic scenario” of the “alternative homeland” completely disregard its great risk to Israel.  The chances that Hashemite control will be lost to a Palestinian majority are slim, and this could only happen if the West were to completely withdraw their support.  The more likely development is that as a result of increasing internal pressures, it will have to form a secular, Islamic Jordanian-Palestinian national coalition, which will pressure it to gradually distance itself from Israel until all manifestations of peace disappear. In addition, the king will be coerced to court Hamas openly, which has been done in secret until now, far from the eyes of the media. This is considered critical by Jordanian political and security leaders in order to prevent tension and conflict as Hamas continues to gain strength because of the stalemate in the peace process. This coalition might also push Jordan towards Turkey and Iran, and Israel will find itself facing a new regional alignment that no longer has a pro-West orientation.